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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present the core of Kant's critique of traditional metaphy-
sics and ontology as a transcendental semantics that allows reformulating the problem 
about the objects and their reality. In order to achieve this purpose, we propound a 
paper divided in two parts: 1. A brief justification of Kant’s semantics interpretation; 2. A 
work program based on a semantics comprehended as a fundamental part of a method 
of resolution of philosophical problems. Basically, we can state that the critical position 
against traditional metaphysics and ontology leads to the question upon: how are a 
priori synthetic judgments possible? This question leads to its conditions of possibility, 
1 Translation to English: Ana Carolina Meinerz.
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that is: sensible representations; intellectual representations; syntactic rules; semantic 
rules (or referential rules, on the relation between intellectual representations and some 
sort of sensibility or affection); the operator of the syntactic and semantic rules (subject, 
man, human nature, gender, people etc.). This is what we call the core of Kant’s critique 
and with which we may begin to solve philosophical problems even beyond those pre-
sented by our philosopher. As such, we are briefly going to observe the following steps: 
1. From metaphysics in its various senses to the ontology of sensible objects; 2. A critique 
of pure reason against dogmatic metaphysics; 3. Criticism as semantics; 4. The semantic 
project and the kinds of judgments; 5. Human nature and the theory of judgment; 6. The 
work program within Kant’s own work; 7. Subsequent results of Kant’s project. 
Keywords: Kant. Semantics. Ontology. Metaphysics. Criticismo. Transcendental.
Resumo
O objetivo deste texto é apresentar o núcleo da crítica kantiana à metafísica e à ontologia 
tradicionais como uma semântica transcendental que permite reformular o problema acer-
ca dos objetos e da sua realidade. Para alcançar tal fim propomos uma comunicação em 
duas partes: 1. Uma breve justificação da interpretação semântica de Kant; 2. Um programa 
de trabalho a partir de uma semântica entendida como parte fundamental de um modo de 
resolução de problemas filosóficos. Basicamente, podemos dizer que a posição crítica con-
tra a metafísica e a ontologia tradicionais leva à questão acerca de: como são possíveis os 
juízos sintéticos a priori? Esta pergunta conduz às suas condições de possibilidade, isto é: re-
presentações sensíveis; representações intelectuais; regras sintáticas; regras semânticas (ou 
referenciais, de relação entre as representações intelectuais e algum tipo de sensibilidade ou 
afetividade); o operador das regras sintáticas e semânticas (sujeito, homem, natureza hu-
mana, gênero, povo, etc). Isto constitui o que chamamos o núcleo da crítica em Kant e com o 
qual podemos começar a resolver os problemas filosóficos inclusive para além dos apresen-
tados por nosso filósofo. Nesse sentido, seguiremos sumariamente os seguintes passos: 1. Da 
metafísica em seus vários sentidos à ontologia dos objetos sensíveis; 2. Uma critica da razão 
pura contra a metafísica dogmática; 3. Critica como semântica; 4. O projeto semântico e os 
tipos de juízos; 5. A natureza humana e a teoria do juízo; 6. O programa de trabalho dentro 
da própria obra de Kant; 7. Os resultados subsequentes do projeto de Kant.
Palavras-chave: Kant. Semântica. Ontologia. Metafísica. Crítica. Transcendental.
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It will be good for metaphysics not to take concepts for things or even 
their names for concepts therefore reasoning entirely on emptiness.
Kant.
Introduction
 
From metaphysics in its various senses to the ontology of sensible objects
Within Kant’s work, we find different ways of defining the con-
cepts of metaphysics and ontology. Some of these definitions refer to 
the work of dogmatic tradition in the history of philosophy, others 
report to a new meaning given in-relation-to or from-the critical work 
and transcendental philosophy2. In the specific case of the concept 
of metaphysics already stated in the pre-critical period, Kant says in 
Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (Dreams of a vi-
sionary) that this subject offers two types of benefits:
The first is to carry out tasks which raises the inquiring mind when co-
mes to discover through reason hidden properties of things. However, 
on this matter, the result much disappoints hope and has escaped our 
eager hands. 
Ter frustra compressa manus, effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucrique simílima somno3.
The other advantage comes more appropriate to the nature of human 
understanding and it is to prove whether the task is proportionate to 
what can be known or not, and the relation between this matter and the 
concepts of experience upon which all our judgments must always be 
2 There are many works consulted during preparation of this research. We mention the most relevant for our reflection. 
Laywine, A (1993) Kant's early metaphysics and the origins of the critical philosophy. Volume 3 NAKs. California: Ridgeview 
Publishing Company. Daval, R (1951) La métaphysique de Kant. Perspectives sur la métaphysique de Kant d'après la théorie du 
schématisme. Paris: Presses Universitaries de France. Freuler, L (1992) Kant et la métaphysique spéculative. Paris: Vrin. 
3 Translation: For three times his image moves vainly through his hands as a subtle wind like a fleeting dream. Virgil Aeneid II 
793-794 and 701-702 VI.
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supported. In this sense, metaphysics is a science of the limits of human 
reason ... (A 115)4
Indeed, the "two advantages" Kant mentions in 1766 are nothing 
but only two perspectives under which we may comprehend metaphy-
sics as what has so far resulted and as a task:
1) As an inquiry beyond the experience, Kant’s disappointment 
relates to the concept of soul proposed by Swedenborg and 
analyzed in that text;
2) As a science of the boundaries.
One concerns the tradition’s frustrating exercise (because it is 
never decisive) which seeks the hidden, the other indicates a task to 
be done and it is characterized as having a negative consequence. On 
the one hand, according to the 1766 text’s results, dogmatic assertions 
about the concept of soul donnot resist through the analysis of its su-
pposed validity in different contexts of use. Kant comes to the conclu-
sion that we can not apply this category in any cognitive situation5. 
On the other hand, the task of knowing how far we can progress with 
the use of the understanding in the expansion of knowledge would 
not provide new knowledge, but it would avoid the illusion of seeking 
or stating what is beyond our limits. The problem of stating this or 
that positive knowledge about something shifts to an earlier point and 
leads off to take into account the conditions upon which this or that 
knowledge may be pronounced. 
Yet in the full 1790s, once entirelly developed the horizon of criti-
cal philosophy, in the beginning of the manuscript on Welche wirklichen 
Fortschritte sind die, die Metaphysik und seit Leibnizens Wolffs Zeiten in 
4 We have used two translations as references for the reading and interpretation of the text in german, one in spanish and the 
other one in portuguese. However, the translation used in the text was done by us. 
5 I held an analysis of the procedure of this text in Perez, D. O. (2008, 92 e ss.) Kant e o problema da significação. Curitiba: 
Champagnat, (2009) A Loucura como questão Semântica: Uma Interpretação Kantiana. Trans/Form/Ação, São Paulo, v. 32, 
n. 1, p. 95-117.
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Deustschland gemacht hat? (Progress of Metaphysics)6, Kant begins by 
stating that metaphysics is "a sea without shore where progress leaves 
no marks" (Kant Ak XX, 259). However, he also questions as follows: 
"What is exactly that reason seeks out of metaphysics? What ultima-
te purpose (Endzweck) does it have with its formulation? "(Kant XX 
Ak, 259). Thus, metaphysics would be "the science that purposes the 
progress of the sensible knowledge to the supersensible through re-
ason "(Kant XX Ak, 260; italics added by us). The sensible knowledge 
would concern to the objects of the sensibility, which are studied by the 
sciences of possible experiences; and the supersensible would reach a 
kind of knowledge that does not concern to those kinds of experiences. 
Within this framework, Kant operates a reduction or a delimitaton of 
the meaning of ontology that Christian Wolff (2005) considered to be 
the prime philosophy. Against it, I quote Kant, namely:
Ontology is that science (as part of metaphysics) which constitutes a 
system of all concepts and principles of understanding, but only to the 
extent that refers to objects that can be given to the sensibility and be certi-
fied by the experience. Ontology does not touch the supersensible, ul-
timate purpose, however, of the metaphysics, thus does not belong to 
this last one but as propaedeutics, as porch or atrium of the mataphy-
sics itself and it is called transcendental philosophy for it contains the 
conditions and first elements of all our a priori knowledge. In it there has 
not been much progress since Aristotle (Kant XX Ak, 260; italics added 
by us).
Any excess in the attribution of coverage of the presented con-
cepts must be avoided while reading this paragraph. First, the phrase 
"all our a priori knowledge" refers only to all our a priori knowledge re-
garding the objects of cognitive experience, as we may specify from what 
is said at the beginning of the quote. This means that this definition of 
ontology reaches less the being qua being (either aristotelian or wolffian) 
6 For an in-depth study of the concept of metaphysics in the Progress there is a work by Mario Caimi (1989) La metafísica de 
Kant. Reconstrucción de la argumentation del escrito de Kant. Los progresos de la metafísica desde lá época de Leibniz y de Wolff. 
Buenos Aires: Eudeba Publisher. There is salso a work by Feliz, Duke (1987) Estudio Preliminar. IN Kant, I. (1987) Los progresos 
de la metafísicas desde Leibniz y Wolff. Madrid: Tecnos Editorial.
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that the objects of a possible experience defined and delimited only in the 
first critique. Thus, Kant states that "ontology is a resolution of know-
ledge in a priori concepts of the understanding and has its use in expe-
rience" (Kant Ak XX, 260). Therefore, we must warn that, in this case, 
we are not speaking of the practical philosophy’s objects. Still, a con-
troversial point would be whether this definition of ontology includes 
the objects of mathematics or knowledge by framing of concepts, or 
not. We understand that although at times the excerptions may be am-
biguous, implying that it comes to given objects, it is pertinent to state 
that it refers to sensible objects both pure and empirical. Therefore, it 
would effectively include objects like numbers or geometrical figures 
and also physical objects. 
In turn, and secondly, a relation of equivalence between ontolo-
gy and transcendental philosophy is settled. Hence, we have yet ano-
ther issue that is neither trivial nor unproblematic: the writing of the 
1790s reduces "transcendental philosophy" to an "ontology" and this 
one to the "science of the concepts and principles that refers to objects 
that can be given to the sensibility". We believe that along the develo-
pment of GMS (Grounds) and KPV (The Critique of Practical Reason) 
there is another meaning of the wording "transcendental philosophy" 
that includes not only "the science of the concepts and principles that 
refers to objects that can be given to the sensibility" but also "the inves-
tigation about the supreme principle of morality", whereas a special 
kind of knowledge extends only to the principles of pure reason, with 
nothing empirical. But Kant, controversially, did not include this point 
in the text of Fortschritte (Progress).
In order to make our position explicit we can say that we per-
ceive that Kant begins with a restricted notion of transcendental phi-
losophy in the first critique connected to ontology explicated in the 
theoretical reason, and later he develops the concept of extended trans-
cendental philosophy including the supreme principle of morality ex-
plicated in the practical reason. This movement will be comprehended 
in Fortschritte (Progress) by Kant as the transition from ontology to 
metaphysics, as reframed concepts and, wherefore, differed from the 
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meaning of the those ones used in the tradition characterized by Kant 
as dogmatic.
A critique of pure reason against dogmatic metaphysics
According to Kant in Fortschritte (Progress), metaphysics "in its 
scholastic concept is the system of all the principles of pure theoretical 
rational knowledge through concepts, in short: it is the system of pure 
theoretical philosophy" (Kant XX Ak, 261). Thus, the dogmatic meta-
physical thinkers went forward with ontological principles beyond the 
objects of experience where nothing can be confirmed or refuted, that 
is, said as valid, precisely because it's no longer about the sensible, but 
the supersensible. "This is the way of the dogmatics, previous to Plato 
and Aristotle, but extendable to Leibniz and Wolff ..." (Kant Ak XX, 
262). This natural and illusory way of the operation of reason itself fin-
ds, in contrast, the skeptics’way with its doctrine of doubt about the 
dogmatic assertions. The third step taken by metaphysics is held in 
the Critique of Pure Reason in terms of the capacity (Vermögen) of a 
priori expansion of human knowledge in general. According to Kant, 
the three times (dogmatism, skepticism and criticism) are based on the 
very nature of the human capacity of knowledge in its operation. This 
means that it is not a continuous line of absolute overcome, but three 
times that can always restart according to the way reason operates. 
In order to move forward on a comment of the "progress of me-
taphysics" and understand the nature of a critique of pure reason, we 
shall divide the question into a formal section and a material section. 
The formal part that concerns us for the purpose of observing the pro-
gress of reason in trying to solve its necessary problems is divided by 
Kant into three steps:
1) To make the distinction between analytic judgments and synthe-
tic one; 
2) To formulate the question: how are a priori synthetic judgments 
possible?;
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3) To establish the problem of the possibility of a priori synthetic 
judgments: this is, to discuss its possibility and to prove its ob-
jective reality.
In this third point, about the possibility (validity) and evidence, 
we find the indispensable syntactic and semantic elements we shall hi-
ghlight. Only with the deployment of that route, which is concluded 
by the presentation of the elements for an evidence, within a critique of 
pure reason, we will be able to retake the problem of the possibility of 
a metaphysics along Kant:
The transcendental philosophy, that is, the doctrine upon the possibi-
lity of all a priori knowledge in general, which is the critique of pure 
reason and whose elements have been now fully presented, has as its 
aim the establishment of a metaphysics, whose purpose, for its turn, 
while purpose of pure reason, propones itself to extend the bound of 
the sensible to the supersensible; and this is an over step (Überschritt), 
which in order not to be a dangerous shift, once it is not a continuous 
process within the same order of principles, an extreme concern is re-
quired related to the boundaries of both territories (Kant, AK XX, 272). 
At the same time, it is deterrent to move forward on the theore-
tical knowledge beyond the objects of experience, as it is defined in its 
concepts and principles under the notion of ontology, the critique of 
pure reason sets the stage to advance the possibility of a knowledge 
with the mere principles of pure reason, which is being called here as 
metaphysics. In this sense, Kant is conclusive: the results of a critique 
of pure reason would allow us to state that the "amplitude of theore-
tical knowledge of pure reason does not extend beyond the objects of 
the sensibility" (Kant, Ak XX, 273) "no knowledge of the supersensible 
is possible with regard to the speculative capacity of reason" (Kant, Ak 
XX, 277). "For the ultimate purpose of metaphysics, as it is an attempt 
to transcend the sensible and move on to the supersensible, this know-
ledge is, therefore, inappropriate" (Kant, Ak XX, 286). The restriction in 
the advance of knowledge by reason is given by the way Kant grants 
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objective reality to the categories. Kant mentions two procedures with 
respect to the categories of the understanding and the ideas of reason: 
the scheme and the symbol (Kant, Ak XX, 279-280). These two pro-
cedures provide referential rules (semantic ones) to the objectification 
of the categories used in the formulation of the knowledge stated in 
judgments. If the referential rules are restrictive as for the use of the 
categories and limit what can be considered a valid theoretical know-
ledge, then we shall ask along with Kant: "What kind of progress can 
metaphysics make on the supersensible?" (Kant, Ak XX, 296). Kant will 
reserve the term “supersensible” to refer to the territory of freedom. 
It would go from philosophy as speculative science to philosophy as 
doctrine of wisdom (Kant, Ak XX, 301). The performed transition is 
from the theoretical reason, which tries to report on the cognitive ex-
perience and its limits, to the practical reason, which tries to report on 
the practical experience (or moral experience in a broad sense) which is 
already pure, that is, only on principles of reason. Therefore we do not 
go from a physical knowledge of objects to a metaphysical knowledge 
of transcendent entities but from a domain of objects given to the sen-
sibility to another domain, that of freedom. As such, Kant explains in 
the Introduction to the third critique the location of the concepts used 
in one domain and in the other one. I quote Kant:
The concepts, to the extent that they can be related to its objects and 
regardless of whether it is possible or not to have knowledge of them, 
have their field (Feld), which is determined simply according to the rela-
tion its object has with our capacity of knowledge. The part of this field, 
wherein knowledge is possible for us, is a territory (Boden) for these 
concepts and for the capacity of corresponding knowledge. The part of 
this field to which they dictate its laws is the domain (Gebiet) (dithio) of 
these concepts and the capacities of knowledge that fit them (Kant, KU 
XVII).
So then we have the scope of the objects given through the sen-
sibility (and here we find the ontology) and the scope of freedom 
and its respective concepts (what Kant is pointing out in the text 
Fortschritte [Progress] as metaphysics). Regarding the part concerned 
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to a transcendent theology, Kant makes his position very clear with 
regard to a speculative on the Ens Originarium, metaphysics and the 
limits of ontology. I quote Kant (Ak XX, 301-304):
With metaphysics reason wants to make itself a concept of the origin of 
all things, of the original being (ens originarium) and of its intrinsic na-
ture; it subjectively begins by the original concept (conceptus originarius) 
of thingness in general (realitas), that is, of that whose concept repre-
sents in itself a being the difference of that whose concept represents a 
non-being, however,  in order to objectively think the unconditional of 
the original being, it represents this original being as if it contained the 
whole (omnitudo) of reality (ens realissimum), thereby determining com-
pletely its concept of supreme being, which no other concept draws, 
and with regard to the possibility of such being, as Leibniz adds, there 
is no difficulty in proving, because the realities as mere statements can 
not contradict themselves, and what is thinkable because of its concept 
does not contradict itself, that is, everything of which a concept is possi-
ble is also a possible thing, this is, none the less, something before which 
reason guided by the critique may well enough shake its head.
It will be good for metaphysics not to take concepts for things or even 
their names for concepts therefore reasoning entirely on emptiness.
According to Kant, in the dogmatic metaphysics we make a sub-
jective condition of thought the objective condition of possibility of 
things themselves. Thus, we mistake concepts that may have a logical 
meaning with things that must be given in sensibility. Freud names 
this phenomenon schizophrenia. However, Kant shows that it is the 
procedure of a dogmatic metaphysics which has not made that funda-
mental distinction and tries to prove any of these two statements:
1) A perfect metaphysical being must necessarily exist, for if it did 
not exist it would miss perfection.
2) A being that exists as a necessary being must have got supre-
me perfection, for if it hadn´t, it would not be a priori fully de-
termined by its concept, therefore, it could not be conceived as 
necessary.
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By the logical-semantic analysis of statements, Kant comes to the 
conclusion that out of a supposed existence we can not affirm a neces-
sary existence. The central issue herein will be about what existence is. 
While in dogmatism the existence is a predicate, in Kant the existence 
as a position will be propounded. The rule which enables the concept 
of existence to be applied to objects given in sensibility (space-time) 
will grant the restriction of its use and will allow the bounds of a kno-
wledge said valid to be settled (Perez, 2008, 74 ss/ff).
This is how we understand Kant's definition of ontology in KrV 
A 247:
Its fundamental propositions are merely principles of the exposition of 
the phenomenon, and the snooty name of ontology, which accredits to 
itself the pretension to offer, in a systematic doctrine, a priori synthetic 
knowledge of things in themselves (eg. the principle of causality) must 
be replaced by most modest denomination of simple analytics of pure 
understanding.
Indeed, what the Transcendental Analytics offers are exposu-
re principles of the phenomenon and not predicates of the being qua 
being or the thing-in-itself. Seen in these terms, Kant’s referencialist 
mark leads us to define the critical project from a transcendental se-
mantics. It is within this development of this transcendental semantics, 
out of the transcendental deduction of the categories, going through 
the schematism, to the principles of understanding that we shall find 
the "ontological" argument. In other words, the ontological matter is 
solved within a drawing upon the what and the how of the judgments, 
that is, upon what is related and how it is related in the structure of a 
judgment.
Criticism as semantics
The Critique of Pure Reason has been interpreted over the last 
two hundred years in many different ways, namely: as psychology, 
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theory of knowledge or even as the groundwork for metaphysics. 
Among all the interpreters, to name a few, we may mention from the 
most contemporary ones as Patricia Kitcher (1990), to the wide range of 
the ones called neo-Kantian as Herman Cohen (1885) or his opponents 
as Heidegger (1998).
However, according to Kant, a critique of pure reason should 
provide us the elements to recognize whether a knowledge can be said 
valid or not. This would allow us to decide whether the metaphysical 
problems of transcendent objects are able to be solved by means of the-
oretical reason or not. Thereupon Kant said in KrV B 19 that the real 
problem of a critique of the reason is contained within the question: 
how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? In other words: what 
are the conditions of possibility for a statement to be considered valid, 
that is, to be determined as true or as false? This is the starting point 
for understanding criticism as from the judgment’s structure. We may 
say that this was the schedule of the interpretations on the critique over 
the past 50 years. Yet the problem would not be reduced only to the 
syntactic structure of propositions but it would be outspread to the 
meaning of the concepts involved in its formulation. This is something 
Kant himself gradually understood in the pre-critical period. It can be 
seen especially at the end of the text on the false subtlety of the four 
figures of the syllogism and in that one on the only possible argument 
for the existence of God (Perez, 2008; Valentim, 2009). Thus, among 
those who consider the structure of the judgment as the fundamental 
element and the starting point we can find a subgroup that highlighted 
the semantic element.
Rudolf Zocher (1959, 138 e ss./ff.) in Kant Grundlehere. Ihr Sinn, 
ihre Problematik, ihre Aktualität states that there is an update of the 
Kantian doctrine of transcendentality and of validity in terms of a 
semantics even in neokantianism and especially in Emil Lask (2003) 
in Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre (written in the early 
twentieth century, miding the 1911 edition). Lask sought to perform 
the transcendental thought under the elimination of subjectivity in 
the form of a pure objective semantics. On this regard Zocher alleged: 
Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016
Ontology, metaphysics and criticism as Transcendental Semantics as of Kant 471
"No doubt there are principles in Kant’s doctrine for a pure objective 
semantics" (Zocher 1959, 143).
Butts, R. (1969) in Kant's schemata as semantical rules; Sellars, 
W. (1968) Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes and 
Hintikka (1973) Logic, Language-games, and Information: Kantian Themes 
in the Philosophy of Logic are work cases where the semantic matter is 
mentioned.
Wolfram Hogrebe (1974) in Kant und das Problem einer transzen-
dentalen Semantik situated the central problem of Kant's doctrine as the 
issue of meaning (Bedeutung). In order to develop his thesis he begins 
by examining the multiple signification of the word "Konstitution" both 
in its non-philosophical and philosophical meanings up to the idea of 
"Wortgebrauchs" in Carnap, the analytic tradition and Kant. With these 
elements and with the analysis of a part of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
especially the transcendental schematism, he propones a transcenden-
tal semantics in Kant.
After Hogrebe, there is the work of Brittan (1978) in Kant's Theory 
of Science with another mention of Kant’s semantical problem.
Zeljko Loparic’s semantic interpretation developed in his doc-
toral thesis (1981) and published as a book (2000) under the title A se-
mântica transcendental de Kant offers us new elements. The difference 
among Lask’s texts (2003), in which we find the beginning of a theory 
of the concept in Kant, Zocher (1959), in which we can read a mention 
of the possibility of a semantics in Kant, and Hogrebe (1974), in which 
a transcendental semantics as of an analysis and interpretation of the 
schematism inserted into the tradition of the problem of the use of the 
concept is formulated, Loparic’s thesis presents an exhaustive analysis 
of the entire structure of the first critique which allows us a systematic 
reading of the work wherein all of its elements contribute. The critique 
understood as a theory of resolution of the problems of reason and the 
transcendental semantics as its center allow us to respond to the issue 
unfolded by the skeptics against the dogmatics concerning the vali-
dity of the theoretical objective knowledge, not in order to propone a 
"new metaphysics" but to propound a query upon the conditions of 
possibility (validity) of the propositions in a cognitive experience.
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There are other works in line with a semantical interpretation 
or that mention the problem carried out after Loparic’s. For instance, 
Brandt (1995) The table of judgments: Critique of pure reason A 67-76; B 92-
101; McDowell (1994) Mind and World; Robert Hanna’s (2001) Kant and 
the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy and A.B. Dickerson’s (2003) Kant 
on representation and objectivity. I will restrict myself to the fundamental 
structure of all the thesis expounded by the semantic interpretation of 
Campinas during the years 1980, 1990 and 20007.
The semantic project and the kinds of judgments
According to Kant, the metaphysical problems are not merely 
idle or dispensable for they are produced by the very operation of re-
ason. In this sense, they must be considered as being determined as 
possible to be resolved or not. I quote Kant (KrV A VII)
Human reason, in a certain field of its knowledge, has the singular fate 
to find itself plagued by questions that cannot be avoided, for they are 
imposed by its nature, but to which it can neither answer for they quite 
overcome its possibilities.
It is just because the problem is formulated in the very opera-
tion of reason that Kant seeks a solution inquiring as such. In order to 
decide on the matter, Kant queries for the conditions of possibility of a 
priori synthetic propositions. I quote Kant (KrV B19)
Nevertheless the real problem of pure reason is within the question: 
How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?
The fact that metaphysics has remained in so vacillating state of un-
certainty and contradiction until today is simply due to not having 
7 There is a series of papers published by many researchers within the semantic interpretation in the form of articles, 
dissertations and theses. I will cite here as an indication the ones published in Faggion, A & Beckenkamp, J. (2013) Temas 
semânticos em Kant. Sao Paulo: DWW Editorial. The term "semantic school of Campinas" was formulated by Ricardo Terra in 
(2012) História e Direito em 1784. Comentários sobre a interpretação da “Escola Semântica de Campinas”. Studia Kantina 12: 
175-194.
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thought this problem over sooner, perhaps not even the distinction be-
tween analytic judgments and synthetic judgments. The redemption or 
the downfall of metaphysics is based on the solution of this problem or 
on a satisfactory demonstration that there really is no possibility to re-
solve what it seeks to see enlightened.
The procedure of analysis and synthesis used by Kant in the pre-
sentation of his investigation allows us to find the ingredients or ele-
ments of judgment and get to a result. This gives us, as conditions of 
possibility of the judgment, sensible representations, intellectual repre-
sentations, syntactic rules of the relation among concepts, semantic or 
reference rules that link concepts to intuitive multiple, operative rules 
of the function of reason in a broad sense which enables to perform the 
device that carries out the syntactic and semantic rules, and the opera-
tor of the rules which Kant calls human nature or also human reason.
Thereat we are in a position to move from the natural disposition 
to the decision upon the metaphysics as a science. I quote Kant (KrV 
B22):
Thus, in all men and since within them reason raises to speculation, 
there has always been and will continue to be a metaphysics. Therefore, 
and also upon it, the question is made: how is metaphysics as a natural dis-
position possible? that is, how do the questions, which pure reason rises 
and that, on its own needs, is taken to resolve the best way it can, arise 
from the nature of human reason in general?
However, as so far all attempts to respond to these natural questions, 
such as, for example, whether the world has a beginning or it has been 
there since eternity, etc., always met with unavoidable contradictions, 
we can not be satisfied with the mere natural disposition of pure reason 
to metaphysics, that is, with the pure capacity of reason, from which, by 
the way, a metaphysics is always born (whatever it is); on the contrary, 
it has to be possible, as regards it, achieve one certainty: the knowledge 
or ignorance of the objects, that is, a decision as to the objects of its in-
terrogations or as to the ability or inability of reason to formulate judg-
ments that refer to them; consequently, to extend our pure reason con-
fidently or to put safe and determined limits on it. This last issue, that 
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comes along with the general problem outlined above, could rightly be 
formulated as: how is methaphysics as a science possible?
Thereby, the problem of the nature of cognitive experience’s ob-
ject and the ability of reason to formulate judgments referring to them 
is presented as the core issue formulated in the question about the pos-
sibility of judgments.
This problem is not only formulated in the first critique in 1781 
and 1787. The kantian philosophy’s program is expressed in the same 
way throughout the entire work. In Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten (GMS) 1784, referring to the problem of practical reason, Kant 
says: "Now the question arises: how these imperatives are possible." 
Kant still advances into a specification of the undertaken task. I quote 
(AA 04, GMS 48): 
[...] the question of how the imperative of morality is possible is un-
doubtedly the one that needs solution, since it is by no means hypo-
thetical and, consequently, the objectively represented necessity can not 
be based on any assumption as in the hypothetical imperative.
However, this task seems to be only drafted in the GMS regar-
ding what this work states (AA 04 GMS 95): 
How such a synthetic practical proposition is possible a priori and why 
it is necessary, that is a problem whose solution is not within the limits 
of Metaphysics of Morals, neither have we stated its truth here, much 
less have we claimed to hold in our possession a proof of the same.
But finally in AA 04, GMS 110, the question explicitly arises 
again, indicating right after a demonstration of "how is a categorical im-
perative possible?".
The explicit question about the possibility of synthetic proposi-
tions is neither limited to theoretical reason nor to practical reason. In 
the third critique, within the "Research on the question whether in the 
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judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging or if this 
judging precedes the pleasure," Kant says: "The solution to this pro-
blem is the key to the critique of taste and hence worthy of full atten-
tion”. At this point there is the following statement:
The pleasure we feel we ascribe to every other person, as if when we 
find something beautiful, it were a quality of the object, which would be 
stated in it according to concepts; for beauty by itself, without reference 
to the feeling of the subject, is nothing. Yet we have to lay aside the dis-
cussion of this question until we get the answer to that other one: how 
are aesthetic judgments possible? (AA 05 KU 30).
Kant's sentence is as clear as it is in the other two cases. Both 
in theoretical reason and practical reason as in reflective judgments, the 
problem is the possibility of synthetic propositions; that is, how cognitive, 
imperative and aesthetic a priori synthetic judments are possible. 
Therewith we would already have elements to believe that the 
problem of pure reason in its systematic critical task, as transcendental 
philosophy in a broad sense (not just restricted to the first Critique), 
goes decidedly through the question about the possibility of judgments. 
However, the different moments of Kant's text in which the task appe-
ars explicitly do not end there. In Die Religion Innerbalb der Grenzen der 
blossen Vernunft (RGV), we can mention a very enlightening footnote:
If the proposition 'There is a God', therefore: 'There is a supreme good 
in the world', has (as a proposition of faith) to come only from moral, 
it is an a priori synthetic proposition; although it is accepted only on 
practical reference, it goes beyond the concept of duty, that moral holds 
(and that does not presuppose any matter of will, but only its formal 
laws), and therefore can not be developed as from moral. But how is 
such an a priori proposition possible?
Kant continues:
The consonance with the simple idea of a moral lawgiver of all men is, 
of course, identical to the moral concept of duty in general and thus the 
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proposition that commands such a consonance would be analytical. But 
the acceptance of the existence of an object says more than its mere pos-
sibility. The key to solving this problem, as far as I believe to discern it, 
I can only indicate here, without explicating it. (AA 08, RGV BA IX – X)
In this line of thought, we may think that the Kantian question on 
the possibility of propositions is extended to the doctrine of right with 
the statement: "This is mine." I quote Kant in paragraph 6 Deduction of 
the conception of purely juridical possession of an external object (possessio 
noumenon):
The question “How external mine and yours are possible” is resolved 
within the question “How is a purely juridical (intelligible) ownership 
possible? ”, and this one, for its turn, in the third one: “How is an a priori 
synthetic juridical proposition possible?”
We can also find the same concern about history in the text: Der 
Streit der Fakultäten, where Kant must decide on the validity of the pro-
position "The human race progresses toward the better." It is an a priori 
synthetic proposition and therefore its validity can not be decided nei-
ther only by the law of identity and non-contradiction nor empirically.
In all cases we have cited here, the possibility (validity) of a priori 
synthetic propositions is resolved as to not only clarify the syntactic 
rules of its structure (Subject – logical connective - predicate: S.p) but 
also to introduce some sort of sensible element among its ingredients. 
This allows to establish some sort of reference.
In the first critique, the categories of understanding relate to in-
tuition and thereby restrict its use to the objects given in sensibility 
(Loparic, 2000; Perez 2008). In the second critique, we already have a 
principle of pure reason and a kind of feeling that Kant calls “respect” 
(Achtung) (Loparic, 1999; Perez 1999, 2001, 2008). In the third critique, 
we find the categories linked to a feeling of pleasure and displeasure 
(Loparic, 2001, 2010; Perez, 2006, 2008). In the doctrine of judgment, 
this is mine relates to a coercive force of the Estate (Loparic, 2005). In the 
reflection on history, the progress toward the better of the republic’s 
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ideas is associated with the affection of enthusiasm (Perez, 2006, 2014)8. 
In each case (each type of judgment), we find that the intellectual re-
presentations do not stand on its validity without being related to some 
form of sensible element. This operation of Kant is what we call trans-
cendental semantics.
The use of term semantics refers to the problems of meaning, 
signification and reference of the concepts explicitly exposed by Kant 
throughout his work. The problem of the meaning of concepts is not 
a Kant’s invention. In the dialogue by Plato (2014), Cratylus, we find 
a reflection on the origin of language and the relation of words with 
what they refer to. In Aristotle’s Logic (2008), not only the meaning of 
the word but also of the proposition is explicated. We could also say 
that the elaborations of apophantic logos and semantic logos refer to 
the question of meaning. The term semantikos that is also found in the 
studies of the Stoics is translated by semantics and in german by bezei-
chend, expression used by Kant. In Sumulae logicales by Pedro Hispano 
(1986), which takes up much of the scholastic tradition, we also find 
developments of theories of meaning, an assumption of something like 
an intentional and extensional semantics and also an assumption of 
a realistic semantics (Beuchot, 1992). In the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Locke (2012) also approaches the problem of the me-
aning of words. All this is to show that it is not about a new problem 
discovered this century or the last one. Even Donald Davison (1985, 
1999) states that the study of the general structure of language was 
done by Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Russell, Frege, Wittgenstein, 
Carnap, Quine and Strawson.
However, Kant has no theory of the origin of language as well 
as no general theory of meaning, only he approaches the problem of 
the validity of propositions regarding the signification of the concepts 
and thereunto uses a very specific semantics that Loparic (2000) calls 
Transcendental. It is about the elements and the modes of the relation of 
signification which allows to decide whether a particular propositional 
8 Each of these cases was treated under different aspects in articles, theses and dissertations in the semantic school of 
Campinas.
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kind may be valid or not in a particular experience, whether cognitive, 
practical, aesthetic, on law or on history. It is no other things besides 
the question about what (was) is related and how (wie) it is related.
The old ontology as the science of being and metaphysics as the 
knowledge of the supersensible was replaced in Kant by the analysis of 
propositional kinds and the constitution of meaning fields where these 
propositions may come to make sense, that is, they may be said as valid 
or as invalid and thereat they can come to be used in the formulation of 
problems and eventually in their respective resolutions.
Human nature and the theory of judgment
Kant’s theory of judgment starts from the structure S.p and dra-
ws a distinction, according to the general mode of validation, between 
analytical (whose resolution is given by the law of identity and non-
-contradiction) and synthetic (whose resolution is not given by the law 
of identity and non-contradiction and it requires another element). The 
latter one is divided into a posteriori and a priori regarding the expe-
rience. The transcendental semantics refers to what and how on these 
last propositions. In turn, the a priori synthetic propositions are divided 
into different kinds according to the type of experience one needs to 
approach (cognitive, practical, aesthetic ...).
Nevertheless, Kant's task does not end here but it still consists of 
building the apparatus that runs the rules in each case. The operator 
or executant of the rules is called by Kant as subject, man (in a generic 
sense), human nature, mankind, humanity, people or community ac-
cording to the propositional kind and the experience in question. The 
subject of the cognitive experience must have concepts, logical opera-
tors and also perceptions (first critique), but it does not need to have 
a sense of respect, this is essential in the moral experience (second cri-
tique). Similarly, the aesthetic experience requires a sense of pleasure 
and displeasure (third critique), but the affection of enthusiasm is in-
dispensable in the sublime judgment and in history (third critique and 
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the second part of the Conflict of Faculties). In each case, the specific 
sensibility corresponds to the kind of judgment in each experience. 
We could also say that the work procedure we perform as from 
Kant is noticed in the following steps: 1. set the kind of the fundamen-
tal proposition stated in the experience in question, 2. find its compo-
nents, 3. enunciate its syntactic rules, 4. enunciate its referential rules, 
5. enunciate its operators and 6. build the executant of the rules and 
logic operators that formulates the statement within a field of meaning. 
Not only it is not about accomplishing the totality of being yet neither it 
is about erecting a unifying subject. Although we can say it is about the 
same reason, its functioning, the operating elements and the operator 
itself change.
With this procedure, not only do we grant systematic unity for 
the reading of transcendental philosophy - showing that it is not some-
times theory of knowledge, sometimes moral, sometimes art, someti-
mes biology, but it is about the possibility of synthetic judgments - as 
well as we are able to go beyond the experiences and kinds of judg-
ments formulated by Kant and comprehend transcendental seman-
tics as a philosophical labor. Thus, the work program can proceed: 1. 
Within the very work of Kant; 2. In reading of the history of philoso-
phy; 3. Approaching the conditions of possibility of other experiences.
The work program within Kant’s own work
In 1982, Zeljko Loparic, before the examination table of the faculty 
of philosophy and letters at the Catholic University of Louvain, defended 
his doctoral thesis entitled Scientific solving-problem ina Kant and Mach and 
which he had been working on since 1978. The thesis of the work sees the 
Critique of Pure Reason as a theory of resolution of unavoidable problems 
of reason and, thereby, Kant’s metaphysics of nature is a scientific research 
program within the field of nature. To this end, Loparic propounds that 
the method used by Kant is the analysis and synthesis from the greek ge-
ometers and that reason is a problem-solving human apparatus with sen-
sible and intelectual operations and representations. He also propounds 
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that the transcendental analytic is to be interpreted as transcendental se-
mantics, that is, an a priori theory of reference and truth that would ground 
Kant’s theory of resolution of problems. Thus, the metaphysics of nature, 
as an a priori scientific research program, has a first level based on the ca-
non of the power of judgment doctrine and a second level based on heuris-
tic or regulative canon of speculative reason. In tis sense, a dynamic theory 
of matter as an a priori research program for the rational mechanics is de-
veloped. The doctoral work has a second part dedicated to Mach’s concept 
of science and establishes a relation with Kant. Regarding the first part, 
since 1982 a series of studies on specific themes and issues has been pu-
blished in the form of articles and book chapters with the consequences of 
this thesis, in the same way, others have proceeded on different topics and 
presented their findings in the form of dissertations, theses and articles. 
Thereby, a significant number of researchers has developed dissertations 
and theses advancing at different points in the semantic interpretation 
during the decades of 1990 and 2000. Suze Piza, Olavo Pimenta, Marcos 
Alberto Oliveira, Agostinho Meirelles, Orlando Linhares, Alexandre 
Hahn, Claudio Sipert, Andrea Faggion, Joãonzinho Beckenkamp, Fábio 
Scherer, among others (including myself), worked on the line started by 
Loparic in Campinas9. Currently, there are several theses been written at 
9 Regarding dissertations originated out of the transcendental semantics in the first critique and its consequences on the 
entire transcendental philosophy advised by Zeljko Loparic himself we shall highlight: Marco Antonio Frangiotti. Kant e 
a análise geométrica grega. 1989; Silvio Pinto. Uma reconstrução lógica da segunda antinomia da razão pura. 1991; Daniel 
Omar Perez. Significação dos conceitos e solubilidade dos problemas. 1996; Marcos Alberto de Oliveira. Razão problematizante 
e investigação científica na filosofia kantiana da natureza. 2000; Agostinho de Freitas Meirelles. História e objetividade 
em Kant. 2002; Olavo Calabria Pimenta. Elementos fundamentais da analítica transcendental de Kant. 2003; Andréa Luisa 
Bucchile Faggion. O papel do facto da razão na fundamentação da moralidade em Kant. 2003; Cesar Tadeu Fontoura. Aspectos 
semânticos da exposição transcendental do juízo de gosto. Estudo sobre a estética kantiana na Crítica da faculdade do juízo. 
2004; Alexandre Hahn. Problemas semânticos na doutrina da virtude de Kant. 2005; Fábio César Scherer. Intuição e dedução 
nas regras para a direção do espírito. 2005; Juliano César de Lazari. O método combinado de análise e síntese em Kant. 2006; 
Chelaine da Silva. Faktum der Vernunft: considerações sobre suas interpretações. 2006; Cláudio Sipert. O problema da realidade 
objetiva da idéia do sumo bem em Kant. 2008; Ricardo Machado Santos. Moralidade e história na Idéia de uma história universal 
de um ponto de vista cosmopolita de Kant. 2010; Fabiano Queiroz da Silva. A liberdade prática na Crítica da razão de Kant: o 
problema da compatibilidade entre a solução crítica da terceira antinomia e o Cânone. 2010; Rodrigo Augusto Rosa. Sistemas 
teóricos em Kant: o controle da experiência mediante as máximas da razão. 2011; Ricardo Machado Santos. Moralidade e 
História na Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita de Kant; 2011; Diego Frederichi. Posse Jurídica e 
Estado na Doutrina do Direito de Kant. 2014. Regarding doctoral theses supervised by Loparic, we shall highlight: Leopoldo 
Fulgencio. O método especulativo em Freud. 2001. Daniel Omar Perez. Kant e o problema da significação. 2002. Fábio César 
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different postgraduate programs in Brazil which work, dialogue or reject 
the semantic interpretation. Along this period, it was also realized that the 
work held in the first critique could be explicated in the second one upon 
practical propositions, further upon reflective propositions, law, history, 
pedagogy, politics, virtue and so on. 
Thus, we shall keep on progressing in order to elucidate the pro-
blem of the different kinds of judgments and the objects of different 
domains as well as the construction of different operators inquiring 
into the published texts, lessons, reflections and letters.
Subsequent results of Kant’s project
In the nineteenth century, german idealism as from Fichte, 
Schelling, Schopenhauer and Hegel had propounded a philosophy 
after Kant and under great criticism against him. They attacked his 
lack of ultimate unity, the negative on accessing the thing-in-itself10, 
which they considered logicism or formalism and characterized 
Scherer. Teoria kantiana dos juízos jurídico-políticos a priori segundo o método de análise e síntese. 2005. Alexandre Hahn. 
A função da antropologia moral na filosofia prática de Kant. 2005. Marcos Alberto de Oliveira. A idéia de uma doutrina da 
virtude na metafísica kantiana dos costumes. 2005. Orlando Bruno Linhares. A gênese das antinomias matemáticas kantianas. 
2005.  Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion. Dedução transcendental e esquematismo transcendental. 2007. Alexandre Hahn. A 
função da antropologia moral na filosofia prática de Kant. 2009. Agostinho de Freitas Meirelles. Crítica e história na filosofia 
de Kant. 2009. Fábio César Scherer. Teoria kantiana dos juízos jurídico-políticos a priori segundo o método de análise e síntese. 
2010. Cláudio Sipert A modificação de sentido do sumo bem na filosofia tardia de Kant 2013. Suze de Oliviera Piza. Semântica 
transcendental e semântica histórica. 2014. Ricardo Machado Santos. Sobre os fins da razão: Auto-formação e perfeição moral 
do homem no pensamento tardio de Kant, 2015.  Rodrigo Augusto Rosa A Synthesis Speciosa como uma abordagem modelo-
teorética das ciências exatas em Kant, 2015. These productions unfold in other researches advised by other researchers in 
postgraduate courses in other Brazilian universities, especially at the Universidade Federal de Londrina and the Pontifícia 
Universidade do Paraná.
10 In Juan Adolfo Bonaccini (2000) A dialética em Kant e Hegel. Ensaio sobre o problema da relação entre ser e pensar. Natal: 
Editora da UFNR, we find an excellent study upon the ideas and the antinomies in Kant, upon the question on the absolute 
in Hegel and upon how the critique from Hegel to Kant on the issue of antinomies is presented. Em Juan Adolfo Bonaccini 
(2003) Kant e o problema da coisa em si no idealismo alemão. Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará, we find the reconstruction 
of the question upon the thing-in-itself in Kant and his contemporaneity. The study includes a review of Reinhold, Jacobi, 
Maimon, Schulze, Beck, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, besides the approach to the twentieth century’s interpretations of 
the problem, such as: Prauss, Buchdahl and Allison. Both works by Bonaccini (2000 and 2003) are the starting point for an 
understanding of the project change on the problem approached by Kant.
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his work at various times as psychology. Certainly, it is neither an 
overcoming of the kantism nor a deepening, but a change of project. 
Indeed, german idealism comes to be another philosophical project 
— a project that sets out its statements as from the absolute and it is 
from this impossible place that it also sets out the criticisms against 
Kant. Therefore, we go from the question about the conditions of pos-
sibility of synthetic propositions on a particular experience (cogniti-
ve, moral, aesthetic etc.) to the perspective of the whole. In this way, 
we return to the assertion of what can not be sustained, according to 
the critical philosophy. Resuming german idealism projects from its 
basis means a way of affirming the metaphysical procedure that Kant 
had criticized since 1781. However, while reviving the problem of the 
unity of the system and the problem of access to the thing-in-itself, 
such idealistic reflections are the basis for subsequent attempts of an 
ontological thought, especially with regard to new self-proclaimed 
realistic attempts in all its modalities.
In the twentieth century, there are several philosophical projects 
that resumed the question on metaphysics and ontology and which 
can be divided into four main lines of research: 1. phenomenology; 
2. analytic philosophy; 3. marxism; 4. post-structuralism. Phenomeno-
logy starts out of Husserl’s critique against Descartes and Kant and 
opens a new research field later developed by Heidegger, Sartre, Mer-
leau Ponty and current phenomenologists. Analytic philosophy, regar-
ding ontology, starts out from Russell and Carnap and progresses with 
Quine; currently it is held by Searle and logical semanticists. In this 
line, Kant was criticized on the notion of experience and the validi-
ty of his invention of "a priori synthetic judgments". Marxism develo-
ped an ontology with Lukács, another with Adorno and, nowadays, 
another with Badiou, much away from Kant. Deleuze’s and Derrida’s 
post-structuralism, in several different ways, propounds another kind 
of debate on ontology and metaphysics. Anyway, in all cases we find 
criticism against Kant as a decisive element of its philosophical work. 
In general, from all the four lines, the critiques are against his lack of 
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introduction of historical time, the notion of experience, the invention 
of synthetic judgments or the formulation of the transcendental subject. 
A preliminary diagnosis shows us that in a broad aspect it was 
not possible to do philosophy and resume the problem of metaphysics 
and ontology without establishing a relation with Kant’s work. Given 
the ample horizon of the debate, I will indicate only four works publi-
shed in the twenty-first century (according to the lines indicated above) 
on ontology and metaphysics, which proposes a thought on the issue 
after Kant: 1. Quentin Meillassoux (2008) After Finitude: An Essay On 
The Necessity Of Contingency; 2. Markus Gabriel (2011) Transcendental 
Ontology: Essays in German Idealism; 3. Timothy Williamson (2013) 
Modal Logic as Metaphysics; 4. Renuad Barbaras (2013) Dinamique de la 
Manifestacion. Meillassoux seeks a speculative realism resuming his 
inheritance in relation to Alain Badiou. He discusses the question of the 
subject and the meaning of propositions as from Descartes and against 
Kant. Gabriel seeks to explain the being also as from the absolute, since 
the tradition started by Schelling, and questions the kantian investiga-
tion on the conditions of possibility claiming a realism. Williamson is 
inscribed in the analytic tradition in dialogue with Kripke and Russell, 
working the meaning of propositions in the course of semantics. 
Finally, Barbaras brings up Husserl's phenomenology rethinking the 
conditions of the experience.
We understand that within this horizon of proposals and discus-
sions it is possible to resume transcendental philosophy with regard to 
what we see as reality and the behave in relation to it and in it. I think it is 
possible in each case to give an answer as from the very work of Kant. 
The result of the resume of Kant’s work to answer contemporary on-
tological formulations is what we will call a semantic neokantianism. 
The procedure to be retaken is the question about the conditions of 
possibility of an experience as from the question about the condition 
of possibility of the statement. The beginning of the task is guided by 
the enunciation point of the statement in question to which we must 
return in order to elucidate and determine the starting point itself. This 
is how we understand the kantian route that goes from the question 
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on the possibility of synthetic propositions to the development of an 
anthropology from a pragmatic point of view as a science.
In recent years, in the scope of analytic philosophy, a large 
amount of works on semantics and pragmatics that allow us to advan-
ce ontological and metaphysical issues with new tools have been deve-
loped, some of them not only consider the structure of the statements 
in the speech but also the subject of enunciation. Within phenomeno-
logy, progress was made on the concept of experience in relation to a 
self or to the subject of that experience. Either one element or the other 
(semantic and pragmatic elements and the notion of experience) may 
be considered useful to advance the idea of a semantic as philosophy.
We also believe that as of the transcendental semantics work pro-
cedure it is possible to rebuild a reading in the history of philosophy as 
from its problems, resolution modes and validation of these resolution 
modes. We understand that Lucas Angioni’s interpretation on the work 
of Aristotle draws nearer this type of approach. Likewise McDougal’s 
reading on Hegel emphasizes the semantic element. Sonia Barreto and 
Suze Piza essayed transcendental semantics and existential semantics 
on one case and historical semantics on another case in the reading of 
Heidegger and Foucault respectively in their different doctoral theses 
at Unicamp. As well as Patricia Kauark proposes a semantics and prag-
matics to meet the conditions of possibility of the quest upon semantic 
fields in quantum mechanics. Robert Hanna explicitly claims a contem-
porary neokantianism.
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